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Inequality and Identity at Work
A clinic at the University of Calgary law school in 2014 worked with unions and
workers'rights groups to develop constitutional challenges to the historic exclusion
of farm workers from labour and employment legislation in Alberta. After exploring
arguments under sections 2(d), 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, we concluded that, based on the existing jurisprudence, the equality
rights arguments under section 15 were the weakest. This article explores what is
lost when we fail to recognize the identity-based harms that flow from government
violations of equality rights. It considers the nature of these harms, why they may
be minimized or ignored, and the consequences of ignoring those harms. These
issues are examined in the context of workers' rights, and in particular those of
farm workers, but the analysis is also relevant to broader contexts. The article
concludes with thoughts on how the Supreme Court of Canada's approach to
section 15 of the Charter should be modified in order to better capture identity-
based harms.
En 2014, une clinique de la faculte de droit de I'Universite de Calgary a travaille
en collaboration avec des syndicats et des groupes de defense des droits
des travailleurs pour elaborer des contestations constitutionnelles a I'exclusion
historique, en Alberta, des travailleurs agricoles des lois sur le travail et I'emploi.
Apres avoir etudie les arguments fondes sur le paragraphe 2(d) et sur les articles
7 et 15 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertes, Iauteure conclut qu'en
vertu de la jurisprudence actuelle, les arguments de droits a I'egalite invoquant
Particle 15 sont les plus faibles. Larticle pose la question de savoir ce qui est
perdu lorsque ne sont pas reconnus les prejudices fondes sur Iidentite qui
resultent de violations par le gouvernement de droits a I'egalit. II etudie la nature
des prejudices, demande pourquoi ils peuvent 6tre minimises ou laisses de c6te,
et les consequences qui en decoulent. Ces questions sont examinees dans le
contexte des droits des travailleurs, en particulier des droits des travailleurs
agricoles, mais I'analyse est tout aussi pertinente dans de plus vastes contextes.
L'auteure conclut avec des reflexions sur la fagon dont la Cour supr~me du
Canada applique Iarticle 15 de la Charte devrait 6tre modifiee pour mieux cerner
les prejudices fondes sur l'identite.
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Calgary. I wish to thank the constitutional clinical
students for their diligent and passionate commitment to this project, and the clients for their tireless
efforts to support the rights of farm workers. Thanks also to Kim Brooks forbringing together scholars
interested in questions related to identity, and to the anonymous peer reviewers for their very helpful
comments on an earlier version of this article.
Jennifer Koshan*
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Introduction
At a constitutional clinical course at the University of Calgary Faculty of
Law in the winter of 2014, I worked with a group of students, unions and
workers' rights groups to develop constitutional challenges to the historic
exclusion of farm workers from labour and employment legislation in
Alberta.1 After exploring arguments under sections 2(d), 7 and 15 of
the Charter, we concluded that, based on the existing jurisprudence, the
section 15 arguments were the weakest. 2
1. Employment Standards Code, RSA 2000, c E-9; Labour Relations Code, RSA 2000, c L-1;
Occupational Health and Safety Act, RSA 2000, c 0-2 [OHSA]; Workers' Compensation Act, RSA
2000, c W-15.
2. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. The students' work is summarized in the following
ABlawg posts: Kay Turner, Gianna Argento & Heidi Rolfe, "Alberta Farm and Ranch Workers: The
Last Frontier of Workplace Protectiof' (28 April 2014), online: ABlawg <ablawg.ca/2014/04/28/
alberta-farm-and-ranch-workers-the-last-frontier-of-workplace-protection>; Brynna Takasugi, Delna
Contractor & Paul Kennett, "The Statutory Exclusion of Farm Workers from the Alberta Labour
Relations Code" (2 May 2014), online: ABlawg, <ablawg.ca/2014/05/02/the-statutory-exclusion-of-
farm-workers-from-the-alberta-labour-relations-code/>; Nelson Medeiros & Robin McIntyre, "The
Constitutionality of the Exclusion of Farm Industries under the Alberta Workers' Compensation Act"
(14 May 2014), online: ABlawg, <ablawg.ca/2014/05/14/the-constitutionality-of-the-exclusion-
of-farm-industries-under-the-alberta-workers-compensation-act/>; Graham Martinelli & Andrew
Lau, "Challenging the Farm Work Exclusions in the Employment Standards Code" (27 May 2014),
online: ABlawg, <ablawg.ca/2014/05/27/challenging-the-farm-work-exclusions-in-the-employment-
standards-code/>. See also Jennifer Koshan et al, "Farming the Constitution: The Illegality of
Excluding Alberta Farm Workers from Labour and Employment Legislation" in Shirley McDonald &
Bob Barnetson, eds, Farm Workers i Western Canada: Injustices andActivism, University of Alberta
Press [forthcoming].
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This conclusion dovetails with other research exploring the
transcendence of section 7 of the Charter over section 15 in actions
challenging the harms of government (in)action. 3 Issues involving the
scope of grounds, assumptions about causation and choice, and the test
for discrimination have presented barriers to claims under section 15,
while broad understandings of security of the person and the principles
of fundamental justice have paved the way for successful section 7
claims.4 The Bedford decision from late 2013 suggests a significant
amount of overlap between section 15 and section 7, particularly in cases
involving gross disproportionality, which focus on the adverse effects of
government actions on certain individuals.5 Yet equality arguments were
not made in Bedford or in other recent section 7 successes such as PHS
Community Services.6 In other cases, such as Carter, section 7 arguments
have been prioritized over those made under section 15.7 Relatively
broad interpretations of section 2(d) of the Charter have also tended
3. Jennifer Koshan, "Redressing the Harms of Government (In)Action: A Section 7 Versus Section
15 Charter Showdown" (2013) 22:1 Const Forum Const 31. See also Peter Hogg, "The Brilliant
Career of Section 7 of the Charter" (2012) 58 SCLR (2d) 195; Sheilah Martin, "Balancing Individual
Rights to Equality and Social Goals" (2001) 80 Can Bar Rev 299 at 329-330; Marie-Eve Sylvestre,
"The Redistributive Potential of Section 7 of the Charter: Incorporating Socioeconomic Context
in Criminal Law and in the Adjudication of Rights" (2012) 42 Ottawa L Rev 389; Margot Young,
"Context, Choice and Rights: PHS Community Services Society v Canada (Attorney General)" (2011)
44 UBC LRev 221.
4. Compare, e.g., the section 15 cases Withler v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 SCR 396
[Withler] (denying a claim of age discrimination in the context ofpensionbenefits), Alberta (Aboriginal
Affairs and Northern Development) v Cunningham, 2011 SCC 37, [2011] 2 SCR 670 (applying section
15(2) of the Charter to save the exclusion of some Metis persons from the receipt of benefits), and
Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 SCR 567 (denying a claim
of religious discrimination) to the section 7 cases Victoria (City) v Adams, 2008 BCSC 1363, 299
DLR (4th) 193 aff'd 2009 BCCA 563, 313 DLR (4th) 29 [Adams] (finding that a bylaw violated the
right to security of the person for failing to permit homeless persons to sleep with overhead shelters
in city parks), Canada (AG) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134
[PHS Community Services] (finding that the state violated security of the person for failing to extend
an exemption from the criminal law for a safe injection site), Canada (AG) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72,
[2013] 3 SCR 1101 [Bedford] (finding that criminal prohibitions on prostitutionviolate security of the
person), and Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5 [Carter] (finding that the criminal prohibition against
assisted suicide violated s 7 of the Charter and that a decision on s 15 was unnecessary).
5. Bedford, supra note 4.
6. PHS Community Services, supra note 4. See also Adams, supra note 4.
7. In Carter, the appellants prioritized their s 7 claim because it included the larger group of persons
desiring physician assistance even if they were not unable to take their lives because of physical
disability, whereas the s 15 claim focused on persons unable to take their lives because of physical
disability. See Carter, supra note 4 (Oral argument, Appellant), online: Supreme Court of Canada
<www.scc-csc.gc.ca/case-dossier/info/webcast-webdiffusion-eng.aspx?cas-35591>. The Court also
prioritized s 7 in its reasons for decision (Carter, supra note 4 at para 93).
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to overshadow discrimination claims in the context of constitutional
challenges involving collective bargaining and other labour rights.8
This article explores what is lost when we fail to recognize identity-
based harms that flow from government action or inaction. Identity-based
harms can be defined as those stemming from, or failing to give due
regard to, personal characteristics related to membership in historically
disadvantaged groups, the sorts of harms that the guarantee of equality
in section 15 of the Charter ought to protect against. It is important
to consider the nature of these harms, why they may be minimized or
ignored, especially when compared with those protected by other rights
and freedoms, and the consequences of ignoring such harms. This article
examines these questions in the context of workers' rights, and in particular
those of farm workers. Although the recently elected New Democratic
Party government in Alberta has now passed amendments to include farm
workers in the relevant legislation, my analysis is nevertheless germane to
the challenges with identity-based claims under section 15 of the Charter
more broadly.9
I begin by discussing cases involving the equality rights of workers
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, and consider these decisions
in the context of the historic exclusion of farm workers from labour and
employment legislation in Alberta. I then examine the underlying identity-
based harms that section 15 is intended to protect against relative to the
harms underlying other Charter rights and freedoms. I suggest reasons
why the recognition of identity-based harms has been so difficult for the
Court in the context of workers' rights and argue that the failure to protect
against these harms is significant. I conclude with some thoughts on how
the Court's section 15 analysis should be modified in order to better capture
identity-based harms.
8. Dunmore v Ontario (AG), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 SCR 1016 [Dunmore] (findingthat the exclusion
of farm workers from Ontario's labour code violated s 2(d); the majority did not address s 15); Health
Services and Support Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia, [2007] 2 SCR 391,
2007 SCC 27 [Health Services] (finding that the denial of collective bargaining rights to health care
workers violated s 2(d) but not s 15); Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada (AG), 2015
SCC 1 [Mounted Police Association of Ontario] (finding that a labour regime that denied a meaningful
process of collective bargaining for RCMP members violated s 2(d) of the Charter); Saskatchewan
Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4 [Saskatchewan Federation of Labour] (finding
that denial of the right to strike for essential services workers violated s 2(d) of the Charter); but see
Ontario (AG) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 SCR 3 [Fraser] (finding that a specialized labour
regime for Ontario farm workers post-Dunmore did not violate s 2(d) or s 15); Meredith v Canada
(AG), 2015 SCC 2 [Meredith] (finding that wage rollbacks for RCMP members without consultation
did not violate s 2(d)).
9. Bill 6, Enhanced Protection for Farm andRanch WorkersAct, 1st Sess, 29th Leg, Alberta, 2015
(assented to 11 Dec 2015).
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I. Discrimination against workers and section 15 of the Charter
1. The approach to discrimination generally
Although the Supreme Court of Canada's approach to section 15 of the
Charter has evolved over time,1" it has consistently required proof of a
distinction between the claimant and others based on an enumerated or
analogous ground that is discriminatory in either its purpose or effect.
Analogous grounds were identified in Corbiere as those which are
based on "a personal characteristic that is immutable or changeable
only at unacceptable cost to personal identity" and "characteristics...
that the government has no legitimate interest in expecting us to change
to receive equal treatment under the law."" Discrimination has been
defined as variously involving the imposition of burdens or deprivation of
benefits; 2 the violation of essential human dignity; 3 and the perpetuation
of disadvantage, prejudice or imposition of stereotyping.1 4 It invariably
involves comparative analysis, though the Court has been more flexible in
its approach to comparison in recent years. 15
2. Discrimination against workers
In the more specific context of workers' rights, the Supreme Court has
recognized that work is a crucial component of personal identity. In the
Alberta Reference, Chief Justice Dickson stated:
Work is one of the most fundamental aspects in a person's life, providing
the individual with a means of financial support and, as importantly,
a contributory role in society. A person employment is an essential
component of his or her sense of identity, selfworth and emotional
wellbeing. Accordingly, the conditions in which a person works are
highly significant in shaping the whole compendium of psychological,
emotional and physical elements of a person's dignity and self-respect. 6
10. For a discussion of the Court's evolving approach to s 15 see Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette Watson
Hamilton, "The Continual Reinvention of Section 15 of the Charter" (2013) 64 UNBLJ 19 [Koshan &
Watson Hamilton, "Continual Reinvention"].
11. Corbiere v Canada (Miister ofIndian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 SCR 203 at para 13, 173
DLR (4th) 1 [Corbiere].
12. Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 174-175, 56 DLR (4th) 1
[Andrews].
13. Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497 at para 88, 170
DLR (4th) 1 [Law].
14. R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 at para 17, [2008] 2 SCR 483 [Kapp]; Withler, supra note 4 at paras 37-
39; Quebec (AG) vA, 2013 SCC 5 at para 323, [2013] 1 SCR 61 [Quebec vA]; Kahkewistahaw First
Nation v. Taypotat, 2015 SCC 30 [Taypotat].
15. Andrews, supra note 12 at 164; Law, supra note 13 at para 56; Withler, supra note 4 at para 63.
16. Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 SCR 313 at 368, 38 DLR
(4th) 161, Dickson CJC, dissenting [Alberta Reference] [emphasis added].
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This passage has been cited by the Court numerous times in cases involving
labour and employment matters such as mandatory retirement,17 damages
for wrongful dismissal,18 and unions' freedom of expression.19 However,
a majority of the Court has never ruled in favour of a section 15 claim
framed around the ground of occupational status. While there are claims of
discrimination on other grounds that have been at least partially successful
in the employment context,2" those tied to occupational status speak most
closely to identity as a worker, and will be my focus here.
The protection of occupational status under section 15 of the Charter
was first considered in Reference re Workers' Compensation Act 1983
(Nfld).21 In one short paragraph, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed
the argument that mandatory coverage under workers' compensation
legislation, with a corresponding inability to sue one's employer for
damages related to workplace injuries, violated the Charter. According
to the Court, "[t]he situation of the workers and dependents here is in no
way analogous to those listed in s. 15(1)... [as] required to permit recourse
to s. 15(1). "22
The next case, Delisle v Canada (Deputy AG), was a challenge to
the statutory inability of RCMP officers to form labour unions with the
full range of rights extended to other groups of workers.23 A majority of
the Court dismissed the claimant's arguments under sections 2(b), 2(d)
and 15 of the Charter. On the section 15 claim, the majority recognized
that the impugned statute imposed differential treatment on Delisle, as
it deprived RCMP members of a benefit available to most other public
service employees. However, "professional status or employment of
RCMP members" were not seen as analogous grounds under section 15,
17. McKinney v University of Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 229 at 300, 76 DLR (4th) 545, LaForest J.
18. Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd, [1997] 3 SCR 701 at para 93, 152 DLR (4th) 1, Jacobucci
J; McKinley v BC Tel, 2001 SCC 38 at para 53, [2001] 2 SCR 161, Jacobucci J [McKinley].
19. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v United Food and Commercial Workers,
Local 401, 2013 SCC 62 at para 31, [2013] 3 SCR 733, Abella and Cromwell JJ [United Food].
20. See, e.g., Lavoie v Canada, 2002 SCC 23, [2002] 1 SCR 769 (with a majority finding
discrimination on the basis of citizenship status in the context of requirements for employment
with the federal public service, but upholding the requirements under s 1); Nova Scotia (Workers
Compensation Board) v Martin, 2003 SCC 54, [2003] 2 SCR 504 (finding discrimination on the basis
of disability in the context of workers compensation benefits); Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v
NAPE, 2004 SCC 66, [2004] 3 SCR 381 (finding discrimination on the basis of sex in the context of
the government reneging on a pay equity agreement in "fiscal crisis" legislation, but upholding the law
under s 1).
21. [1989] 1 SCR 922, 56 DLR (4th) 765.
22. Ibid at para 2.
23. Delisle v Canada (Deputy AG), [1999] 2 SCR 989, 176 DLR (4th) 513 [Delisle]. Although
Delisle was overruled in Mounted Police Association of Ontario, supra note 8, the Court's decision
was based on s 2(d) rather than s 15. I discuss this decision below.
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as these were not "functionally immutable characteristics in a context of
labour market flexibility."24 Furthermore, the distinction was not "suspect"
as it was not of the kind that "often leads to discrimination and denial
of substantive equality.., in view in particular of the status of police
officers in society."25 Nor was the distinction discriminatory, since it did
not "adversely affect the appellant's dignity" and it was not "based on a
characteristic attributed stereotypically to police officers as a group."26 In a
concurring judgment, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 agreed that the law did not
violate section 15, although she framed discrimination more broadly when
she stated that the law did not perpetuate the idea that "RCMP members
are less worthy, valuable, or deserving of consideration than other public
servants... [or] devalue or marginalize them within Canadian society."27
Delisle was followed two years later by Dunmore, where a majority of
the Supreme Court found that the exclusion of farm workers from labour
relations legislation in Ontario violated section 2(d) of the Charter.21
Section 2(d) was interpreted to include the right not to be excluded from a
protective labour relations regime where the exclusion would substantially
interfere with the effective exercise of freedom of association. 29 Under
section 2(d), the majority recognized the unique vulnerability of farm
workers as an economically disadvantaged group, often working in
isolated settings close to their employers, which meant that they could
not form trade associations or have meaningful negotiations with their
employers unless they had legislative protection.3"
The majority did not find it necessary to consider the section 15 claim
in Dunmore, although Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 did so in a concurring
judgment. She found that "there is no reason why an occupational status
cannot, in the right circumstances, identify a protected group," citing
the Alberta Reference, subsequent case law, and the opinions of scholars
to support the notion that "employment is a fundamental aspect of an
individual's life and an essential component of identity, personal dignity,
24. Delisle, supra note 23 at para 44, Bastarache J. The Court had earlier decided that members of
the Canadian Armed Forces were not a protected group under s 15 of the Charter, but this finding was
not framed on the basis ofoccupational status: R v Genereux, [1992] 1 SCR 259, 88 DLR (4th) 100.
25. Delisle, supra note 23 at para 44.
26. Ibid at para 45.
27. Ibid at para 8.
28. Dunmore, supra note 8.
29. Ibid at paras 25, 30. Note however that the Court was careful not to extend the scope of section
2(d) to protect collective bargaining or the right to strike-these matters were left for another day (ibid
at para 68).
30. Ibidatpara4l.
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self-worth and emotional well-being."31 The right circumstances were
present in the case of agricultural workers, whose status was found to
constitute an analogous ground for the purposes of section 15.32 Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 noted that immutability of personal characteristics is
not the only approach to analogous grounds under section 15 and that
grounds should be protected when they relate to aspects of identity that
,.government has no legitimate interest in expecting claimants to change
to receive equal treatment under the law."33 Agricultural workers face
historic disadvantage and lack political power and the government could
not legitimately expect them to change their employment status to obtain
equal treatment. The poor socioeconomic circumstances of agricultural
workers supported the finding that they could change their occupation
only at great cost and that this was not simply a matter of choice.34 In
contrast, Justice Major, writing in dissent, found that occupational status
as a farm worker was not a protected ground because farm workers were
seen as a "disparate and heterogenous group" and any harm they sustained
as a result of being excluded was no more than economic disadvantage.35
In Baier, the Supreme Court considered Alberta legislation that
restricted school employees from running for election as school trustees
unless they took a leave of absence and resigned if elected.36 The claimants
argued that the legislation violated sections 2(b) and 15. A majority of the
Court held that there was no infringement of section 2(b), necessitating
consideration of the section 15 argument, which was framed around
occupational status as the relevant ground. This argument was rejected,
with the majority indicating that there was no basis on the evidence
presented to identify occupational status as an analogous ground. It noted
that "[n]either the occupational status of school employees nor that of
teachers have been shown to be immutable or constructively immutable
characteristics," and that neither of these groups was "a discrete and
31. Ibid at para 167, citing the Alberta Reference, supra note 16; McKinley, supra note 18; Dale
Gibson, The Law of the Charter: Equality Rights (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 257; Dianne Pothier,
"Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real People's Real Experiences" (2001) 13 CJWL 37 at
57. The majority cited the same passage from the Alberta Reference at para 37.
32. Dunmore, supra note 8 at para 166.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibidatparas 168-169.
35. Ibid at para 215, adopting the reasons of Sharpe J in the Ontario Supreme Court (Dunmore v
Ontario (AG) (1997), 155 DLR (4th) 193 at 216-217, 48 CRR (2nd) 211).
36. Baier vAlberta, 2007 SCC 31, [2007] 2 SCR 673 [Baier].
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insular minority," nor was the occupational status of school employee "a
constant marker of suspect decision making or potential discrimination."3
Health Services involved British Columbia legislation that interfered
with the collective bargaining rights of health care workers.3 A majority of
the Supreme Court extended its ruling in Dunmore, finding that procedural
collective bargaining rights are protected under section 2(d). The Court
based this decision on the history of collective bargaining in Canada,
protection of collective bargaining in the international context, and Charter
values.39 In considering Charter values, the Court noted that collective
bargaining "enhances the Charter value of equality" as it "palliate[s] the
historical inequality between employers and employees."4 In light of the
Court's approach to section 2(d), a number of provisions in the legislation
were found to substantially interfere with collective bargaining rights, and
could not be justified under section 141 It was therefore unnecessary to
consider section 15, but the majority did so anyway, dismissing the claim
in one paragraph. The claimants' argument was that the legislation directly
discriminated against health care workers based on the analogous grounds
of employment in the health care sector and status as non-clinical workers,
and that it adversely impacted the workers on the enumerated ground
of sex, since non-clinical health care workers was a group composed
predominantly of women. The majority held that "the differential and
adverse effects of the legislation on some groups of workers relate
essentially to the type of work they do, and not to the persons they are"
and that the statute in question did not reflect "the stereotypical application
of group or personal characteristics. '4 2 Health Services is the only case
in which the Supreme Court considered a claim of workers' rights under
section 15 that included an adverse effects discrimination argument in
37. Ibidatpara 65, Rothstein J. Ina concurring judgment, LeBel, Bastarache and Abella JJ dismissed
the s 2(b) argument on other grounds and gave no additional reasons on s 15. Fish J dissented on s 2(b)
and did not consider s 15.
38. Health Services, supra note 8.
39. Ibid at para 39, McLachlin CJ and LeBel J.
40. Ibid at para 84.
41. Ibidatpara 100.
42. Ibid at para 165. Deschamps J wrote a judgment dissenting in part on s 2(d), but agreeing with
the majority's disposition of the s 15 claim (ibid at para 170).
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addition to an argument of direct discrimination based on occupational
status.43 The Court rejected both lines of argument.44
Fraser was the follow up case to Dunmore, where agricultural workers
challenged the statutory regime enacted by Ontario in response to the
Supreme Court's ruling. 45 This regime was targeted at agricultural workers
and provided a less robust slate of protections than that in Ontario's general
labour relations legislation. 46 Farm workers were granted the rights to form
and belong to employees' associations, to participate in their activities,
to make representations to their employers through their associations,
and to be protected against interference in the exercise of their rights. A
majority of the Court dismissed the challenge under both sections 2(d)
and 15. Although the Court had extended section 2(d) to protect collective
bargaining rights in Health Services, the majority in Fraser found that
the evidence did not establish that the new law had the effect of making
it "impossible to act collectively to achieve workplace goals. 47 Under
section 15, the majority believed the claim was premature because, on the
evidentiary record before the Court, "it [had] not been established that the
regime utilizes unfair stereotypes or perpetuates existing prejudice and
disadvantage. 48 In a concurring judgment that is very brief on this point,
Justices Rothstein and Charron rejected the equality argument on the basis
that occupational status as an agricultural worker had not been established
as a protected characteristic on the evidence.49 In a different concurring
judgment, Justice Deschamps suggested that the majority "conflat[ed]
43. For a discussion of how Health Services illustrates the problems with adverse effects claims
more broadly, see Jonnette Watson Hamilton & Jennifer Koshan, "Adverse Impact: The Supreme
Court's Approach to Adverse Effect Discriminatiof' (2015) 19:2 Rev Const Stud 191 at 210-211
[Watson Hamilton& Koshan, "Adverse Impact"]. InDunmore and Fraser, the fact that a large number
of farm workers are migrant workers was built in to the claimants' argument that occupational status
as a farm worker is an analogous ground, rather than presented as adverse impact discrimination
on the basis of race, national origin or immigration status. See Fraser, supra note 8 (Factum of the
Respondents at paras 139-158 [Fraser, FOR]), online: Supreme Court of Canada < http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/32968/FM030 Respondents Michael-J-Fmser-et-al.pdf>.
44. The Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) was denied leave to intervene on the
sex discrimination arguments in Health Services. See Melina Buckley & Fiona Sampson, "LEAF and
the Supreme Court of Canada Appeal of Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining
Assn v British Columbia" (2005) 17 CJWL 473. The author was a member of the LEAF subcommittee
in this case.
45. Fraser, supra note 8.
46. Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 16.
47. Fraser, supra note 8 at para 46. Abella J dissented, and would have found a violation of s 2(d).
She did not consider the s 15 claim, though she did note in her s 1 reasons that every province except
Alberta provides farm workers the same collective bargaining rights as other employees, comparing
workers on the basis of their occupational status (at para 364).
48. Ibidatpara 116.
49. Ibidat para 295.
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freedom of association with the right to equality," and indicated that
"[t]o redress economic inequality, it would be more faithful to the design of
the Charter to open the door to the recognition of more analogous grounds
under s. 15, as L'Heureux-Dub6 J. proposed in Dunmore."50 Herjudgment
is not particularly clear on why she was unwilling to take this approach in
Fraser, though she did indicate that such a move would amount to a "sea
change" in the interpretation of equality rights.51
These six decisions suggest that the Supreme Court may be open
to finding that occupational status or a narrower subcategory such as
agricultural workers constitutes an analogous ground of discrimination,
but there are some serious hurdles. The Court's rejections of the analogous
grounds argument to date have focused on the lack of immutability of
occupational status, the disparate and heterogeneous nature of the category
(as opposed to a claim involving a discrete and insular minority), and the
privileged status of some claimants as workers. The idea that the law may
target the type of work performed rather than workers' identity has also
led to the dismissal of claims, which appears to involve the attribution of
choice to the workers and the denial of a causal link between the law and
the harms they sustained.52
Section 15 claims based on the equality rights of workers have also
failed because of the reluctance of some members of the Court to see the
treatment of workers as discriminatory. Depending on the prevailing test
for discrimination at the time, the treatment of workers has been seen as
compliant with section 15 for not adversely impacting their dignity, not
relying on stereotyping, not devaluing or marginalizing workers, or only
imposing economic harms.
The cases also suggest that the Court sees the section 15 identity-
based arguments as secondary to the claims based on other Charter rights.
In every case where it had the option, the Court looked at the other Charter
arguments first, and if it was able to avoid the section 15 claim and decide
the case on other grounds, that was the Court's preference.53 This tendency
50. Ibidatpara319.
51. Ibid. For critiques of Fraser from multiple angles, see Fay Faraday, Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker,
eds, Constitutional Labour Rights in Canada: Farm Workers and the Fraser Case (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2012).
52. See Watson Hamilton & Koshan, "Adverse Impact," supra note 43 at 211.
53. For a critique of the Court's tendency to conflate rights and freedoms in labour cases, see Brian
Langille, "Why the Right-Freedom Distinction Matters to Labour Lawyers-And to All Canadians"
(2011) 34 Dal U 143. But see Judy Fudge, "Labour Rights as Human Rights: Turning Slogans into
Legal Claims" (2014) 37 Dal U 601 at 614 n 56, arguing that Langille's approach uses "a very formal
(and thin) conception of equality." The Court's prioritization of other Charter arguments over equality
arguments is a broader issue in section 15 claims outside the context of workers' rights. See Watson
Hamilton & Koshan, "Adverse Impact," supra note 43 at 218.
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may be based on the way the parties presented their claims, but that
strategy may itself have been influenced by the Court's reticence
around discrimination claims. It is telling that in the Court's most
recent labour rights decisions, the parties relied on section 2(d) alone,
even though section 15 arguments based on occupational status were
available .
The section 15 outcomes in the cases discussed in this section do
not seem to turn on whether the legislation at issue dealt with labour
and employment rights or other rights denied to particular groups of
workers. They also do not depend on whether the claim is solely one of
direct discrimination based on the analogous ground of occupational
status or also includes an element of adverse effects discrimination
based on an enumerated ground such as sex. On the other hand, the
Court's finding in Health Services that the government targeted health
care workers because of the nature of their work rather than personal
attributes suggests an unwillingness to recognize identity-based
treatment that is unintentional or effects-based.5
3. Discrimination against farm workers
Based on this case law, it is not surprising that our clinic concluded that
a challenge under section 15 of the Charter to the exclusion of Alberta
farm workers from the relevant legislation was a difficult claim. 6 We
explored arguments of direct discrimination based on the analogous
ground of occupational status as a farm worker and adverse effects
arguments based on the grounds of immigration status (because many
farm workers are migrant workers and may suffer heightened and
unique harms based on that status)57 and sex (because farm workers
54. See Mounted Police Association of Ontario, supra note 8 and Meredith, supra note
8 (forgoing the claim that RCMP officers were an occupational group protected by s 15);
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, supra note 8 (forgoing the claim that essential services
workers were an occupational group protected by s 15). This is not to say that I believe such
claims would necessarily be meritorious; the relative privilege of RCMP members and essential
services workers places them further from the key purposes of s 15 than, for example, farm
workers.
55. This is a widespread problem in adverse effects discrimination cases. See Watson Hamilton
& Koshan, "Adverse Impact," supra note 43.
56. The analysis in this section is based on the clinical project (see supra note 2) as well as
further research and analysis conducted by the author.
57. See, e.g., Fay Faraday, "Envisioning Equality: Analogous Grounds and Farm Workers'
Experience of Discrimination" in Faraday, Fudge & Tucker, supra note 51, 109 at 117-118;
Kerry Preibisch, "Development as Remittances or Development as Freedom? Exploring
Canada's Temporary Migration Programs from a Rights-Based Approach," in Faraday, Fudge &
Tucker, supra note 51, 81; Kerry Preibisch & Gerardo Otero, "Does Citizenship Status Matter
in Canadian Agriculture? Workplace Health and Safety for Migrant and Immigrant Laborers"
(2014) 79:2 Rural Sociology 174.
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are disproportionately male and because farm work and its inherent
dangers may be stereotyped as work that men should be able to endure
without complaint).58
The case law presents several challenges to these arguments. Fraser
may leave open an equality claim based on the analogous ground of
occupational status as a farm worker, if a strong evidentiary foundation
could be laid about the historic and longstanding vulnerability of farm
workers and the cumulative impact of their exclusion from labour and
employment protections. The argument here is that section 15 should
protect as analogous grounds the kinds of occupational status that have
been the basis for mistreatment and devaluation of particular groups of
workers historically and protect against the perpetuation of identity-based
harms in those contexts.59 There are some cases where certain kinds of
occupational status have been recognized as protected grounds under the
Charter and human rights legislation based on this sort of reasoning.6"
Moreover, the Supreme Court has accepted the notion of "embedded"
analogous grounds, such as Aboriginality-residence,61 suggesting that
some kinds of occupational status could be protected even if that category
is not more broadly recognized as an analogous ground. However, as
Fay Faraday documents, the Court ignored these sorts of arguments and
the strong evidentiary record of agricultural workers' disadvantage and
marginalization in Fraser in dismissing the section 15 claim.62
One basis for denying analogous grounds status to farm workers that
flows from the cases discussed above is perceptions about their choice of
58. Arguments could also be made based on disability discrimination under the Workers'
Compensation Act, supra note 1 (see Medeiros & McIntyre, supra note 2), as well as class or social
condition for all the statutes. However, class and social condition are not protected grounds under the
Charter and so an analogous grounds analysis would be required.
59. See Faraday, supra note 57 at 131; Pothier, supra note 31.
60. Faraday, supra note 57 at 133, citing Confederation des syndicat nationaux c Quebec (PG),
2008 QCCS 5076, 177 ACWS (3d) 956 (finding status as a home child care worker to be an analogous
ground). See also NWT(WCB) vMercer, 2014 NWTCA 1, 4 WWR 301 (finding that seasonal workers
were protected against discrimination on the ground of social condition in human rights legislation).
61. Corbiere, supra note 11 atpara 15.
62. Faraday, supra note 57 at 113-114. Faraday was co-counsel for Fraser and the other respondents
at the Supreme Court. Judy Fudge notes a similar invisibility of the evidence of discrimination against
women health care workers in Health Services. See Judy Fudge, "The Supreme Court of Canada
and the Right to Bargain Collectively: The Implications of the Health Services and Support Case in
Canada and Beyond" (2008) 37 Indus U 25 at 29, n 18.
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occupation.63 While the Supreme Court has recently called into question
the extent to which "choice" should be a relevant factor in Charter
claims,64 the fact that immutability remains a key lens for examining
analogous grounds means that assumptions about choice may continue
to be influential at that stage, as the Court recently confirmed in Quebec v
A.65 However, the analysis should look more broadly at whether the aspect
of identity in question is one the government has no legitimate interest in
expecting the claimants to change, or has historically served as the basis
for "illegitimate and demeaning" decision making.66 In addition to the
argument that choice should not be relevant as a matter of law, many farm
workers may not have a real choice of occupation in fact, due to multiple
layers of vulnerability and lack of labour mobility-a condition created,
in part, by the state.6 Yet these arguments were made in Fraser, and did
not persuade the Court to recognize occupational status as a farm worker
as a protected ground.68
Another possible basis from the case law for rejecting the analogous
ground of occupational status as a farm worker is the perceived
heterogeneity of the group.69 Courts have considered diversity within
particular groups as an obstacle to finding analogous grounds in the
area of occupational status, as noted above, but also in the context of
63. See supra notes 23-44 and accompanying text. Assumptions about choice are also evident in
discrimination claims more broadly. See, e.g., Sonia Lawrence, "Choice, Equality and Tales of Racial
Discrimination: Reading the Supreme Court on Section 15" in Sheila McIntyre & Sanda Rodgers,
eds, Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Markham,
ON: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006) 115 [McIntyre & Rodgers, Diminishing Returns]; Diana Majury,
"Women Are Themselves to Blame: Choice as a Justification for Unequal Treatment" in Fay Faraday,
Margaret Denike & M Kate Stephenson, eds, Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive
Equality under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) 209.
64. See Bedford, supra note 4 at paras 86-92; Quebec vA, supra note 14 at paras 336-343, Abella J
for the s 15 majority.
65. Quebec vA, supra note 14 at para 343, Abella J (noting that choice "may be an important factor
in determining whether a ground of discrimination qualifies as an analogous ground.") See also the
judgment of LeBel J, where choice was a key consideration in denying the equality claim.
66. Corbiere, supra note 11 at para 13. See also Robert Leckey, "Chosen Discrimination" (2002) 18
SCLR (2d) 445 at 447 (arguing that analogous grounds analysis should focus on "what sorts of choices
governments in a plural society may legitimately influence"); Joshua Sealy-Harrington, "Assessing
Analogous Grounds: The Doctrinal and Normative Superiority of a Multi-Variable Approach" (2013)
10 JL & Equality 37 (arguing for a "multi-variable" approach to assessing grounds that conceives of
immutability broadly).
67. Dunmore, supra note Sat paras 43-45, Bastarache J, for the majority; ibid at para 169, L'Heureux-
Dube J, concurring. See also Quebec vA, supra note 14 at paras 317, 335 (noting that marital status
was recognized as a protected ground because of the absence of choice in fact in many cases).
68. Fraser, FOR, supra note 43 at paras 140-158.
69. See the discussion of Dunmore (Major J, dissenting) and Baier, supra notes 31-37 and
accompanying text
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other grounds such as poverty and homelessness."0 In other cases, more
narrowly framed groups living in poverty-such as "the poor who beg"-
have been denied analogous grounds status, as their claims have been seen
to relate to activities rather than aspects of their identity.1 This line of
reasoning aligns with the Supreme Court's decision in Health Services,
where discrimination against health care workers was attributed to the
work they do rather than their identity as particular kinds of workers. Farm
workers could also be characterized as a heterogeneous group given that
they include domestic and migrant workers, those working on small farms
and large industrial operations, and so on. However, these considerations
should not undermine their claim to recognition as a group deserving of
analogous grounds protection. Other grounds which include elements of
heterogeneity, activity, or "choice" have been protected under section 15,
such as marital and citizenship status. 2 Nevertheless, it must be recognized
that bariers remain to recognizing occupational status as a farm worker as
an analogous ground.
Moving beyond the issue of grounds, establishing a distinction on the
basis of occupational status as a farm worker would face other hurdles in the
context of some of the relevant Alberta statutes. For example, the Workers'
Compensation Act excludes many other industries from mandatory
coverage, making the comparative element of the discrimination test
difficult to overcome. 3 Similarly, the Occupational Health and Safety Act
has only excluded some farm and ranch workers from its scope ." While
70. See, e.g., Tanudjaja v Canada (AG), 2013 ONSC 5410, 116 OR (3d) 574 [Tanudjaja (ONSC)],
aff'd 2014 ONCA 852, 123 OR (3d) 161, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36283 (25 June 2015),
[2015] SCCA No 39 (striking a claim related to lack of adequate housing brought under ss 7, 15).
On the s 15 claim, the ONSC found that the homeless were too heterogeneous a group to qualify for
analogous grounds protection, distinguishing Falkiner v Ontario (Minister of Community and Social
Services) (2002), 59 OR (3d) 481, 212 DLR (4th) 633 (CA), because receipt of social assistance was
said to be more objective and easier to identify than lack of adequate housing (Tanudjaja (ONSC)
at paras 129-137). The ONCA found both the s 7 and s 15 claims to be non-justiciable. For analysis
supporting poverty as an analogous ground, see, e.g., Martha Jackman, "Constitutional Contact with
the Disparities in the World: Poverty as a Prohibited Ground of Discrimination under the Canadian
Charter and Human Rights Law" (1994) 2:1 Rev Const Stud 76.
71. See, e.g., R v Banks, 2007 ONCA 19 at paras 98-99, 84 OR (3d) 1, leave to appeal to SCC
refused, 31929 (23 August 2007) (denying a s 15 challenge to a law prohibiting "squeegeeing" and
related activities). See also Boulter v Nova Scotia Power Inc, 2009 NSCA 17 at paras 42-43, 307 DLR
(4th) 293, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 33124 (10 September 2009) (finding that poverty did not
meet the test for analogous grounds under s 15); R v PC, 2014 ONCA 577, 121 OR (3d) 401 (rejecting
a s 15 challenge of an accused person based on being indigent).
72. See Leckey, supra note 66 at 459.
73. Workers'CompensationAct, supra note 1, s 14(1); Workers'Compensation Regulation, AltaReg
325/2002, Schedule A.
74. OHSA, supra note 1, s l(s), Farming and Ranching Exemption Regulation, Alta Reg 27/1995
(including operations involving the processing of food, greenhouses, mushroom and sod farms,
nurseries, landscapers, and pet breeders and boarders within the scope of the OHSA).
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this kind of "separate but equal" comparative analysis has been rejected
recently by the Court in other contexts, 5 it would still present a potential
hurdle.
There is also case law denying claims of adverse effects discrimination
by farm workers on the basis of race and immigration status. In Peart, the
Ontario Human Rights Tribunal examined a complaint by farm workers
about their exclusion from provincial legislation requiring a coroner's
inquest following fatal workplace accidents in the mining and construction
industries 76 The tribunal found that while the exclusion drew an adverse
distinction against migrant farm workers on the basis of their race and
immigration status,"7 it was not discriminatory in light of the government's
purpose for singling out mining and construction workers. The evidence
showed that workers in those industries face a greater risk of workplace
fatalities from a greater range of sources than migrant farm workers, and
the tribunal held that the government's targeted approach to inquests
did not perpetuate stereotyping or indicate that the lives of migrant farm
workers were less worthy of protection when viewed in that context.8
Peart reflects the difficulty that the current test for discrimination
creates, particularly when the focus is on prejudice and stereotyping.
These harms of discrimination are normally intentional in nature, and
place the focus of analysis on the purpose of the challenged law rather
than its effects. 79 Even within this narrow focus, however, there are some
persuasive arguments that the exclusion of farm workers from labour
and employment legislation does engage these harms. For example,
any rationale for the exclusions based on minimizing costs for family-
run farms and maintaining their unique character is arguably grounded
in stereotypical assumptions about the nature of agricultural operations
that do not correspond to the actual needs and circumstances of farm
75. See, e.g., Withler, supra note 4 at paras 55-60 (rejecting a "mirror comparator" analysis under
s 15 of the Charter); Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para 30, [2012] 3
SCR 360 (a human rights case where a "separate but equal" approach was rejected in the context of
the education needs of children with disabilities). See also Peart v Ontario (Community Safety and
Correctional Services), 2014 HRTO 611 [Peart],where the human rights tribunal was prepared to find
a distinction even though the legislation in question was targeted at a small segment of workers and
excluded many others.
76. Peart, ibid.
77. Ibid at para 288.
78. Ibidat paras 289-345.
79. Watson Hamilton & Koshan, "Adverse Impact," supra note 43 at 212-213.
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workers employed in large industrial operations." The government's
historical exclusion of farm workers may also be linked to the prejudicial
view that they are not worthy of the protections to which other workers
are entitled, or that they are less likely to fight their exploitation because
of lack of capacity, resources, and labour mobility. 81 This argument was
not successful in Peart, however, even though one would have thought it
particularly strong in the case of migrant farm workers.
It is possible to argue that the focus of the discrimination analysis
should be on disadvantage more broadly rather than prejudice and
stereotyping narrowly, and the Supreme Court seems to be moving in
this direction. 2 If so, the historic exclusion of farm workers from labour
and employment legislation could be shown to perpetuate their historical
disadvantage. The exclusions have the following effects: farm workers
have limited access to minimum standards of employment; they are
subject to the risks inherent in dangerous, unregulated workplaces; they are
typically not entitled to compensation or rehabilitation for their injuries;
and they cannot organize collectively to make their working conditions
less precarious. Moreover, farm owners are correspondingly advantaged:
they can set wages and hours of work that are beneficial to them, employ
child labourers, require dangerous tasks of their workers without fear they
will complain to regulatory bodies, avoid payment of levies for workers'
compensation, and avoid dealing with collective associations of farm
workers. Alberta's former Conservative government was also advantaged
because it depended on the rural vote for its ongoing power, which was
arguably a factor in maintaining the exclusions. 3 Cumulatively, these
harms and the corresponding privileges to farm owners and government
should be seen as discriminatory towards farm workers, but much would
depend on the resolution of issues related to grounds, comparison and the
test for discrimination.
80. Kerry Preibisch, "Local Produce, Foreign Labor: Labor Mobility Programs and Global Trade
Competitiveness in Canada" (2009) 72:3 Rural Sociology 418. See also Kapp, supra note 14 at para
23 for a discussion of the link between stereotyping and the "correspondence factor" from Law, supra
note 13 at para 88.
81. Eric Tucker, "Will the Vicious Circle of Precariousness be Unbroken? The Exclusion of Ontario
Farm Workers from the Occupational Health and Safety Act" inL Vosko, ed, Precarious Employment
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006) 256 at 259 [Tucker, "Vicious Circle"].
82. See Quebec v A, supra note 14 at paras 327-333, Abella J (noting for the s 15 majority that
prejudice and stereotyping are just two indicia of discrimination); Taypotat, supra note 14, Abella J
(focusing onthe perpetuation of arbitrary disadvantage, with no mention of prejudice and stereotyping).
83. See Bob Barnetson, "Some Animals Are More Equal than Others: The Political Economy of
Farm Work in Alberta" [unpublished manuscript on file with author]. See also Faraday, supra note
57 at 137 (noting that the Court inFraser failed to see the corresponding benefits to government and
society flowing from the coerciveness of its policies concerning farm workers).
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Compared with the arguments available under section 15, the arguments
available to farm workers under sections 2(d) and 7 are relatively strong.
Assuming a strong evidentiary record, a section 2(d) challenge to the
exclusion of farm workers from Alberta's Labour Relations Code would
meet the test from Dunmore as the exclusion substantially interferes
with collective bargaining rights. Although Fraser suggested that the
standard for a violation of section 2(d) may have been heightened to
one of "impossibility" of achieving workplace goals, the Court recently
confirmed in Mounted Police Association of Ontario that the test remains
one of substantial interference84 At the same time, Fraser indicates that
legislators could comply with their obligation to protect freedom of
association by enacting a fairly minimalist statutory regime85
Under section 7, the claims are more novel, as there are few Supreme
Court decisions involving the rights to life and security of the person in the
context of labour and employment legislation. 6 Moreover, the Court has
shown reluctance to include economic rights within the scope of section 7
or to interpret section 7 to impose what it sees as positive obligations on
the state outside the adjudicative context.17
However, based on the strong precedents in PHS Community Services,
Bedford, and Carter, an argument could be made that the historic exclusion
of farm workers from the hours of work and child labour protections in the
Employment Standards Code and from the workplace safety protections
in the Occupational Health and Safety Act violate security of the person,
and perhaps the right to life as well.88 These exclusions have increased the
health and safety risks inherent in agricultural work,89 resulting in greater
risks of bodily injury, serious psychological stress, and possible death.
Similar arguments could be made with respect to the exclusion of farm
workers from the Labour Relations Code, in that the lack of possibility
84. Mounted Police Association of Ontario, supra note 8 at paras 73-77. See also Saskatchewan
Federation ofLabour, supra note 8 at paras 77-78.
85. Bill 6, supra note 9, fully includes farm and ranch workers in the Labour Relations Code, supra
note 1.
86. A Charter challenge in Ontario concerning the exclusion of farm workers from occupational
health and safety legislation was abandoned when Ontario amended its legislation in 2006. See
Tucker, "Vicious Circle," supra note 81 at 274-275.
87. See, e.g., Gosselin v Quebec (AG), 2002 SCC 84 at paras 80-83, [2002] 4 SCR 429 (with a
majority finding that s 7 does not protect the right to a particular level of social assistance adequate to
meet basic needs).
88. PHS Community Services, supra note 4; Bedford, supra note 4; Carter, supra note 4; Employment
Standards Code, supra note 1, s 2(4); OHSA, supra note 1, s I(s).
89. Tucker, "Vicious Circle," supra note 81 at 265; Bob Bametson, "No Right to Be Safe: Justifying
the Exclusion of Alberta Farm Workers from Health and Safety Legislations" (2012) 8:2 Socialist
Studies 134; William Pickett et al, "Fatal Work-Related Farm Injuries in Canada" (1999) 160:13 Can
MedAssoc J 1843.
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of union oversight has deprived farm workers of safe workplaces, and
the Workers' Compensation Act, which has excluded farmworkers from
rehabilitation and other benefits in ways that have adversely impacted their
health.9" Provided a sufficient causal connection could be shown between
the exclusions and the increased risks to farm worker health and safety,
violations of the rights to life and security of the person could be made
out.91 As for the hurdles noted above, the impugned legislation clearly
involves more than economic benefits. Furthermore, the government's
only positive obligation would be to extend the undeinclusive legislation
to the excluded group-farm workers-which is akin to the obligation
recognized in Dunmore under section 2(d). The most significant hurdle
to a section 7 claim by farm workers would be the lack of adjudicative
context at play, but the Court has also been receptive to extending section
7 beyond this context.
9 2
Turning to the principles of fundamental justice under section 7, the
historic exclusions of farm workers from the impugned legislation could
be seen as arbitrary, overbroad, and grossly disproportionate as those terms
were defined in Bedford.93 Specifically, the exclusions lack a connection
to the overall purposes of the legislation, go further than required in
protecting the rights of family and small farm owners, and have adverse
effects on farm workers which vastly outweigh their objectives.
Although some of the arguments available under sections 2(d) and
7 overlap with those that apply under section 15-as the Court itself has
noted94-only the section 15 arguments truly get at the notion of "farm
worker exceptionalism": the idea that farm workers have been excluded
90. This argument is supported by Chaoulli v Quebec (AG), 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 SCR 791
[Chaoulli].
91. See Bedford, supra note 4 at paras 74-78.
92. See Chaoulli, supra note 90 at paras 123-124, where three out of seven justices applied s 7
outside the adjudicative context, finding that Quebec's legislative prohibition on private health
insurance violated the rights to life and security of the person.
93. Bedford, supra note 4 at paras 97-123 (finding the criminal prohibitions on prostitution-related
activities to engage all three principles). See also: PHS Community Services, supra note 4 at paras 129-
133 (finding the government's refusal to extend an exemption for a safe injection site to be arbitrary
and grossly disproportionate); Carter, supra note 4 at paras 85-88 (finding the criminal prohibition on
assisted suicide to be overbroad).
94. See Health Services, supra note 8 at para 81, Mounted Police Association of Ontario, supra
note 8 at para 58, and Saskatchewan Federation ofLabour supra note 8 at paras 53-55 (all noting the
equality interests engaged by freedom of association).
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because of their identity as farm workers.95 While Alberta has been
somewhat of an outlier in terms of the breadth and depth of farm worker
exclusions, exceptionalism is not restricted to this context. Farm workers
in other provinces continue to be denied full protection under some labour
and employment legislation,96 and in Alberta, domestic workers are also
excluded from the relevant legislation.9" Perhaps not coincidentally,
domestic workers are disproportionately identified by immigration status,
race and sex as well.9"
The greater likelihood of success of the associational and security of
the person arguments as compared to the identity-based arguments leads
to the questions explored in the next section. To take a step back from the
specific arguments related to farm workers, what is the nature of the harms
protected by the relevant rights, why do the identity-based harms seem to
be minimized or ignored by the courts, and what are the consequences?
II. What is lost when work based inequalities and identities are not
recognized?
It is well accepted that courts are to take a purposive approach in analyzing
Charter claims by focusing on the harms that different Charter rights are
intended to protect against.99 What are the relevant harms in the context of
workers' rights?
Section 2(d) of the Charter protects both individual and collective
interests. The Supreme Court has noted that "freedom of association
must take into account the nature and importance of labour associations
as institutions that work for the betterment of working conditions and
the protection of the dignity and collective interests of workers in a
95. See Eric Tucker, "Farm Worker Exceptionalism: Past, Present, and the Post-Fraser Future" in
Faraday, Fudge & Tucker, supra note 51, 30 at 30 [Tucker, "Farm Worker Exceptionalism"], citing
Greg Schell, "Farmworker Exceptionalism under the Law" in Charles D Thompson Jr & Melinda
F Wiggins, eds, The Human Cost of Food: Farmworkers'Lives, Labor, andAdvocacy (Austin, TX:
University of Texas Press, 2002) 139; Faraday, supra note 57 at 111.
96. See, e.g., Tucker, "Farm Worker Exceptionalism," supra note 95 at 34-35, noting that farm
workers in Ontario continue to be excluded from some aspects of occupational health and safety
and employment standards legislation. See also the Exemptions, Special Rules and Establishment of
Minimum Wage Regulation, 0 Reg 285/01; Farming Operations Regulation, 0 Reg 414/05.
97. SeeEmployment StandardsRegulation, AltaReg 14/1997, s6 (excluding domestic workers from
hours of work and overtime protections); Labour Relations Code, supra note 1, s 4(2)(f) (excluding
persons employed in domestic work in private dwellings); OHSA, supra note 1, s l(s)(ii) (excluding
household servants from the scope of occupations covered by the Act).
98. See, e.g., Pothier, supra note 31 at 43; Daiva Stasiulis & Abigail B Bakan, "Negotiating
Citizenship: The Case of Foreign Domestic Workers in Canada" (1997) 57 Feminist Rev 112. Class or
social condition is also relevant to both groups of workers: see Stasiulis and Bakan, ibid at 112 and the
discussion above at notes 58, 70.
99. R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at para 116, 18 DLR (4th) 321; Mounted Police
Association of Ontario, supra note 8 at para 47.
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fundamental aspect of their lives: employment.""1 ' Furthermore, "human
dignity, equality, liberty, respect for the autonomy of the person and the
enhancement of democracy" are values that "are complemented and
indeed, promoted" by section 2(d) of the Charter."1 In its most recent
decisions on section 2(d), the Court described freedom of association in
terms of empowering those who are vulnerable and marginalized to assert
their voices and to correct imbalances of power. 102 Since Dunmore, section
2(d) has extended beyond the mere protection against state interference
to include the right to state protection of associational freedoms where
that protection is necessary to the exercise of those freedoms.103 To frame
freedom of association, as interpreted by the Court, in terms of the harms
it is designed to protect against, we might say that it provides workers
with a means of remedying the usual disadvantage, power imbalance, and
vulnerability they face in negotiating fair terms and conditions of work.1"4
At the same time, the Court has been clear that associational rights are
largely procedural in nature, protecting processes such as the formation
of associations, collective bargaining, and the right to strike without
guaranteeing any particular substantive outcome." 5
Section 7 of the Charter guarantees the rights not to be deprived of life,
liberty, or security of the person contrary to the principles of fundamental
justice. The right to life protects against laws and state actions that increase
the risk of death.10 6 Liberty includes the right to make fundamental and
inherently personal decisions free from state interference, such as where
to reside, how to raise one's children and, perhaps, one's choice of
occupation. 1 7 Security of the person has been defined to include freedom
from state interference with bodily integrity and personal autonomy and
100. Dunmore, supra note 8 at para 37, citing Delisle, supra note 23 at para 6, L'Heureux-Dube J.
101. Health Services, supra note gat para 81. See also Mounted Police Association of Ontario, supra
note 8 at para 58; Saskatchewan Federation ofLabour, supra note 8 at paras 53-55.
102. Mounted Police Association of Ontario, supra note 8 at paras 55-58; Saskatchewan Federation
ofLabour supra note 8 at paras 54-57. See also United Food, supra note 19 at paras 31-32.
103. Dunmore, supra note 8 at para 41.
104. Faraday, supra note 57 at 136; Fraser, supra note 8 at para 89; Mounted Police Association of
Ontario, supra note 8 at para 82.
105. See, e.g., Mounted Police Association of Ontario, supra note 8 at para 67.
106. Carter, supra note 4 at para 62, citing Chaoulli, supra note 90 and PHS Community Services,
supra note 4. The Court in Carter declined to rule on whether the right to life also protects the right to
a certain quality of life and to die with dignity.
107. Godbout v Longueuil (City), [1997] 3 SCR 844 at para 66, 152 DLR (4th) 577; B (R) v Children
Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 SCR 315 at para 80; R v Malmo-Levine, 2003 SCC 74
at para 85, [2003] 3 SCR 571. Liberty was not the focus of our clinic's arguments for the inclusion of
farm workers in labour and employment legislation, and to the extent that it may be seen to reinforce
arguments about "choice" of occupation that undermine s 15 arguments, it may not be helpful in this
context.
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decision making with respect to one's body.1"8 It also includes a right of
access to medical treatment necessary to protecting life and health.1"9
Beyond physical security, the section has also been interpreted to provide
freedom from serious and profound state-imposed psychological and
emotional stress, including harms such as "stigmatization... loss of privacy,
stress and anxiety resulting from a multitude of factors, including possible
disruption of family, social life and work." ' Although courts have been
cautious about including economic rights within the scope of section 7, as
I indicated above, it arguably protects workers' rights to be free from state-
imposed risks to bodily and psychological integrity, such as the exclusion
from protective legislation. The principles of fundamental justice ensure
that such harms are not imposed in ways that are contrary to our basic
values, for example through laws that are arbitrary, overbroad or grossly
disproportionate to the government's objectives.1
As noted above, section 15 of the Charter has been subject to varying
interpretations over time, perhaps because it protects against harms which
are seen as "elusive" and "more than any of the other rights and freedoms
guaranteed in the Charter," lacking in precise definition. 2 In Andrews,
the Supreme Court defined discrimination as the imposition of burdens
or deprivation of benefits based on grounds relating to the personal
characteristics of the individual or group. 3 The Court also spoke about
discrimination as oppression, noting that "the worst oppression will result
from discriminatory measures having the force of law."14 In contrast,
equality was said to entail "the promotion of a society in which all are
secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings
equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration."1 5 The role of
enumerated and analogous grounds under section 15 was to "limit those
distinctions which are forbidden by the section to those which involve
prejudice or disadvantage" as well as stereotyping. 16 As stated in Turpin,
108. R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30 at 56, Dickson CJC [Morgentaler]; Rodriguez v British
Columbia (AG), [1993] 3 SCR 519 at 587-588, 107 DLR (4th) 342, Sopinka J. These definitions of
security of the person were applied in: PHS Community Services, supra note 4; Bedford, supra note
4; Carter, supra note 4.
109. Morgentaler, supra note 108 at 90, Beetz J; Chaoulli, supra note 90.
110. Morgentaler, supra note 108 at 55, citing Mills v R, [1986] 1 SCR 863 at 919-920, 29 DLR (4th)
161, Lamer J. See also New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G (J), [1999]
3 SCR 46, 177 DLR (4th) 124.
111. Bedford, supra note 4 at para 96.
112. Andrews, supra note 12 at 164.
113. Ibid at 174-175.
114. Ibid at 172.
115. Ibid at 171.
116. Ibid at 181.
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decided a few months after Andrews, the protected grounds focus on
aspects of identity linked to "social, political and legal disadvantage in
our society.""11 Andrews and Turpin thus viewed discrimination in terms
of a number of harms, including oppression, lack of due regard, prejudice,
stereotyping, and disadvantage.
This definition of discrimination prevailed for some time, although
differences of opinion developed amongst members of the Court, for
example with respect to the degree to which government purposes should
be taken into account at the discrimination stage of analysis.118 The Court's
next major consolidation of the test for discrimination came in Law,
where it focused on "the violation of essential human dignity and freedom
through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social
prejudice." '119 Human dignity was said to protect a number of interests:
personal autonomy and self-determination; self-respect and self-worth;
physical and psychological integrity and empowerment; and to protect
against the harms of oppression, marginalization, and devaluation.12
In the Supreme Court's recent section 15 decisions it has purported to
return to Andrews, with a focus on discrimination as the perpetuation or
imposition of prejudice or stereotyping and, sometimes, disadvantage.121
Critics have noted that the range of harms protected in this formulation is
actually narrower than in earlier cases such as Andrews, and that a focus
on stereotyping and prejudice in particular may create barriers in cases
involving unintentional or effects-based discrimination.122 The Court
addressed this critique in Quebec vA, with the section 15 minority insisting
that prejudice and stereotyping are "crucial markers" of discrimination,
and a majority indicating that section 15 protects against other harms,
117. R v Turpin, [1989] 1 SCR 1296 at 1333, 96 NR 115.
118. This debate was most pronounced in a trilogy of cases from 1995, where the Court was deeply
divided on the question of whether discrimination related to "irrelevant personal characteristics." See
Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513, 124 DLR (4th) 609; Miron v Trudel, [1995] 2 SCR 418, 124 DLR
(4th) 693; Thibaudeau v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 627, 124 DLR (4th) 449.
119. Law, supra note 13 at para 88.
120. Ibid at paras 42, 53.
121. Kapp, supra note 14 at paras 17, 24; Withler, supra note 4 at paras 37-39.
122. For a summary of the critiques see Bruce Ryder, "The Strange Double Life of Canadian Equality
Rights" (2013) 63 SCLR (2nd) 261 at 278. See also Koshan and Watson Hamilton, "Continual
Reinvention," supra note 10 at 38-42; Margot Young, "Unequal to the Task: 'Kapp'ing the Substantive
Potential of Section 15" in Sanda Rodgers & Sheila McIntyre, eds, The Supreme Court of Canada and
Social Justice: Commitment, Retrenchment or Retreat (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2010)
183. To the extent that this interpretation of s 15 imposes internal limits, it could be seen as similar to
s 7, though s 15 has not been accorded the same leeway under s I that s 7 has. See Bedford, supra note
4 at para 129.
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including the perpetuation of disadvantage more broadly.123 In its most
recent section 15 decision, Taypotat, the Court spoke of discrimination as
"arbitrary disadvantage," '124 thus maintaining its focus on the purpose of
government actions rather than their effects on disadvantaged groups.
Commentators have also weighed in on the harms of discrimination.
For example, in response to critiques of the Court's "human dignity"
jurisprudence, Denise Raume has tried to rehabilitate that concept to
include a focus on autonomy, self-determination, inherent worth, and
access to dignity-constituting benefits. 25 Sophia Moreau has contributed
to the discussion by defining discrimination in terms of prejudicial and
stereotypical decision making, perpetuation of oppressive power relations,
denial of access to basic goods, 26 and interference with deliberative
freedoms. 2 ' Colleen Sheppard posits a theory of inclusive equality that
focuses on the prevention of social exclusion and marginalization. For
Sheppard, equality has substantive, procedural and relational aspects: "it
is critical to examine both the inequitable substantive outcomes in various
social contexts as well as unfairness and exclusions in the structures,
processes, relationships, and norms that constitute the institutional
contexts of our daily lives."128
Moving beyond the Canadian context, Iris Marion Young described
five oppressions that are relevant to a consideration of (in)equality and
discrimination: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural
imperialism, and violence.129 Nancy Fraser has questioned whether these
harms can be usefully reduced to two categories, those relating to political
economy and culture, requiring remedies of redistribution and recognition
123. Quebec vA, supra note 14 at paras 169, 185, LeBel J, for the minority onthis point; ibid at paras
327-333, Abella J, for the majority on this point.
124. Taypotat, supra note 14 at paras 16, 18, 20, 28, 34, Abella J [emphasis added]. The term "arbitrary
disadvantage" was used only once by Justice Abella in Quebec vA (see supra note 14 at para 331).
125. Denise G Reaume, "Discrimination and Dignity" (2003) 63 La L Rev 645 at 671-674. For a
more recent discussion see Denise Reaume, "Dignity, Choice, and Circumstances" in Christopher
McCrudden, ed, Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 539.
126. Sophia Moreau, "The Wrongs of Unequal Treatment" (2004) 54 UTLJ 291.
127. Sophia Moreau, "What is Discrimination?" (2010) 38:2 Philosophy & Public Affairs 143 at
147 (deliberative freedoms are "freedoms to have our decisions about how to live insulated from the
effects of normatively extraneous features of us").
128. Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: The Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in
Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010) at 4 [emphasis in original].
129. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1990) [Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference]. See also Young's response to Fraser's
critique: Iris Marion Young, "Unruly Categories: A Critique of Nancy Fraser's Dual Systems Theory"
(1997) 222 New Left Rev 147.
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respectively."3 These categories are potentially significant in the case of
workers' rights, which primarily engage economic forms of oppression-
exploitation, marginalization, and powerlessness.131
To summarize, the right to equality protects against the harms of
disempowerment, marginalization, exploitation, devaluation, social
exclusion, prejudice, stereotyping, and disadvantage that are based on or
fail to give due regard to protected grounds of identity. Although there
is some overlap, particularly with respect to protection of individual
autonomy, the harms that section 15 protects against are distinct from those
engaged by section 7 in the sense that they are grounded in group identity.
The harms encompassed by section 2(d) are less obviously distinct from
those covered by section 15. However, associational rights can be seen as
more process oriented than equality rights, which may require substantive
(re)distribution of resources and benefits in some cases. These differences
in the nature of harms, as well as the remedies they may demand, make
it crucial to protect the rights of workers under section 15 in addition to
sections 2(d) and 7.
The harms engaged by section 15 are all present in the context of
farm workers' historic exclusion from labour and employment legislation.
They have been excluded precisely because farm workers are members
of a vulnerable group that is easy to ignore, and they are unable to assert
their interests due to their isolation from one another, lack of education,
socio-economic disadvantage, and precarious immigration status. Whether
intentionally or unintentionally, the government has devalued, excluded,
exploited, and marginalized this group of workers to the corresponding
advantage of farm owners, government, and society more broadly. 132
Why are these identity-based harms so difficult for the Court to
recognize, and what are the consequences of failing to do so?
130. Nancy Fraser, "Recognition or Redistribution? A Critical Reading of Iris Young's Justice and the
Politics ofDifference" (1995) 3:2 J Political Philosophy 166 [Fraser, "Recognition or Redistribution?"].
See also Nancy Fraser, "A Rejoinder to Iris Young" (1997) 223 New Left Rev 126. Fraser's later work
includes a third category: representation See Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political
Space in a Globalizing World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) at 144-147.
131. See Fraser, "Recognition or Redistribution?," supra note 130 at 177-178. Exploitation is defined
as exercising one's capacities under the control of others; marginalization is the condition of expulsion
from systems of labour and social life; powerlessness describes the condition of having power exercised
over a person by others without having any corresponding power. See Young, Justice and the Politics
of DifJerence, supra note 129 at 49, 53, 56; see also Fraser, "Recognition or Redistribution?," supra
note 130 at 174-175.
132. See Fraser, FOR, supra note 43 at para 133, arguing that "equality analysis provides a more
complete context that illuminates why this particular group of workers is denied the law's protection"
[emphasis added].
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One might posit that it is the abstract nature of the harms engaged
by section 15 that makes them "elusive," particularly up against the
more concrete harms encompassed by section 7. Section 15 rights also
have a collective dimension as compared with the individual rights
guaranteed by section 7, with the latter being the paradigm in western
liberal democracies.133 And deferential courts may wish to avoid imposing
positive obligations on the government to rectify identity-based harms.134
However, section 2(d) is also a relatively abstract right with a strong
collective element to it, and, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, it
may lead to obligations on the part of the state beyond non-interference,
though as noted above those obligations will be largely procedural.135 The
obligations that would flow from a successful identity-based challenge to
the exclusion of farm workers from labour and employment legislation
would largely fall on private employers rather than on government, and
would not result in the sort of cost implications to government that may
cause courts to be deferential.136 However, this is still a redistributive
consequence of recognizing farm workers' rights under section 15, which
may explain the courts' hesitation to do so.1 37
Another concern may relate to a floodgates type of argument, that
if occupational status was protected for farm workers, it would be more
difficult to deny the claims of other groups identified by occupational status
or other statuses more broadly. However, recognizing other analogous
133. See Judy Fudge, "The Canadian Charter of Rights: Recognition, Redistribution, and the
Imperialism of the Courts" in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing & Adam Tomkins, eds, Sceptical Essays
on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 335 at 349 [Fudge, "Recognition,
Redistribution and Imperialism"].
134. For cases discussing positive obligations in the context of section 15, see, e.g., Eldridge v British
Columbia (AG), [1997] 3 SCR624, 151DLR (4th) 577; VriendvAlberta, [1998] 1 SCR493, 156 DLR
(4th) 385. For literature discussing the courts' deference in this context, see, e.g., Hester A Lessard,
"'Dollars Versus [Equality] Rights': Money and the Limits on Distributive Justice" (2012) 58 SCLR
(2nd) 299; Sheila McIntyre, "Deference and Dominance: Equality Without Substance" in McIntyre &
Rodgers, Diminishing Returns, supra note 63, 95.
135. See the discussion of Dunmore, supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. See also Fraser,
supra note 8, which affirms the point that s 2(d) does not require a particular model of labour relations.
136. If a government was instead seeking to protect the private sphere from the imposition of
equality-based obligations, this might also be problematic. See Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge,
"Introduction: Privatization, Law and the Challenge to Feminism" in Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge,
eds, Privatization, Law and the Challenge to Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002)
3 (discussing the harms of privatization strategies). See, however, Dunmore, supra note 8, where the
Court found that protection of family farms was a pressing and substantial objective under s 1 of the
Charter, and Quebec vA, supra note 14, where the majority held that excluding defacto spouses from
support and property benefits was justified on the basis of protecting individual choices in the context
of marital status.
137. Fudge argues that recognition claims have been much more successful under the Charter than
redistribution claims. See Fudge, "Recognition, Redistribution and Imperialism," supra note 133 at
341, 349.
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grounds, particularly embedded grounds such as Aboriginality-residence,
has not resulted in a flood of claims to open up the broader underlying
ground.138 Attaching analogous grounds status to those aspects of identity
that relate to the underlying harms of discrimination-oppression,
marginalization, devaluation, exploitation, and disadvantage-would
ensure that section 15 remains focused on its purpose and does not extend
to protecting the interests of relatively privileged groups of workers.139
There is, however, a possible tension inherent in the analogous
grounds requirement that Nancy Fraser's work illuminates.14 Including
a group holding particular personal characteristics within section 15 is
to recognize the significance of their identity, particularly in terms of the
impact of government actions. However, farm workers seek this sort of
recognition primarily as a means of trying to eradicate the differences in
their treatment as compared to other workers. This would normally be
true of other workers seeking recognition under section 15 as well-their
occupational status is relevant only to the extent that they are seeking the
same benefits accorded to other workers. The same can be said of some
other groups seeking recognition of their status under section 15, such
as the poor. To recognize occupational status or poverty as an analogous
ground is significant for the purpose of remedying the inequality attached
to that status through redistribution. The analogous grounds component
of the analysis, focused on recognition as it is, may create a conceptual
tension for courts in cases claiming redistributive remedies.141 It is also
possible that courts are simply seeking to avoid redistribution regardless
of any tensions with recognition rights.
Finally, it could be contended that recognition of farm worker
rights under section 15 is not necessary, as their interests are adequately
protected under sections 2(d) and 7. As I have argued, however, there are
key differences in the harms protected by these sections and the remedies
required to eradicate them. To focus on sections 2(d) and 7 without
recognizing the unique harms of discrimination would reduce section
15 to an equal protection clause rather than a freestanding guarantee of
equality rights. More pragmatically, in the case of farm workers, section
138. See, e.g., Siemens v Manitoba (AG), 2003 SCC 3, [2003] 1 SCR 6 (confirming that residence is
not an analogous ground).
139. See Fraser, FOR, supra note 43 at para 153.
140. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. See also Fudge, "Recognition, Redistribution and
Imperialism," supra note 133 at 350.
141. Redistributive remedies are permitted under the Charter, but typically only where the government
has decided to accord a particular benefit and has been underinclusive in doing so. See, e.g., Schachter
v Canada, [1992] 2 SCR 679, 93 DLR (4th) 1.
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2(d) and section 7 arguments are only available or are stronger for some
legislative exclusions, whereas section 15 engages all of the exclusions
and their cumulative impact. Beyond the specific context of farm workers'
rights, it is crucial that we recognize discrimination as a significant harm
worthy of protection in its own right, given the important reconciliatory
and remedial functions that section 15 can perform in addressing historical
identity-based harms perpetrated against workers and other disadvantaged
groups.
Conclusion
I have endeavoured to show why the protection of identity-based harms
is important and why courts may be struggling with such claims in the
context of farm workers' rights and more broadly. It must be recognized
that equality rights claims will not solve all social problems, take ongoing
work to implement effectively, and may create unintended consequences. 142
Nevertheless, they remain a key site of reform, raising the question of
how courts might modify section 15 analysis in order to better capture the
harms of inequality.
First, there must be a greater willingness to recognize certain forms of
status as analogous grounds under section 15. Courts should not be deterred
by the potential heterogeneity ofgroups such as farm workers orthe possible
mutability or "choices" behind their characteristics. Instead, they should
focus on how the underlying harms of discrimination are engaged by some
identity-based characteristics, including some categories of occupational
status.143 This broader approach to analogous grounds would be consistent
with the current recognition of other status-based grounds, and it would
permit the recognition of other forms of status such as poverty.144 It would
also encourage recognition of the sort of intersecting grounds of identity
that may be at play in the case of some workers, such as race, immigration
status, and gender.145 Even if the recognition of some status-based grounds
is significant primarily for the purposes of attenuating group differences,
142. See e.g. Robert Leckey & Regine Tremblay, "Introduction: After Equality" (2015) 27 CJWL i;
Tucker, "Vicious Circle," supra note 81 at 276.
143. The Supreme Court has recognized grounds based on historical disadvantage, vulnerability and
powerlessness in previous cases. See Sealy-Harrington, supra note 66 at para 48. See also Pothier,
supra note 31 at 41; Colleen Sheppard, "Grounds of Discrimination: Towards an Inclusive and
Contextual Approach" (2001) 80 Can Bar Rev 893 at 908.
144. On the other hand, marital and citizenship status are legal forms of status (see Leckey, supra
note 66 at 459), whereas occupational status and poverty are forms of socio-economic status. This may
raise the issues regarding recognition versus redistribution rights noted above (supra notes 140-141
and accompanying text), though marital and citizenship claims may also involve the redistribution of
benefits.
145. See Faraday, supra note 57 at 135; Pothier, supra note 31 at 43.
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for example by extending benefits to excluded groups, this is an accepted
aim of section 15 analysis. 146
Second, analysis of whether section 15 is violated must account for
a broader range of harms, in keeping with the purposive interpretation
required of all Charter rights and freedoms. As recognized in Quebec v
A and as reflected in the work of the commentators discussed in Part II,
the harms of inequality go beyond stereotyping, prejudice, and arbitrary
disadvantage. A narrow focus on those harms may fail to capture the kinds
of inequalities that farm workers, other groups of workers and other socio-
economically constituted groups are subjected to. A broader approach
to the harms of discrimination would also better recognize claims of
adverse effects discrimination, where the government's actions are rarely
intentional and therefore difficult to characterize in terms of prejudice,
stereotyping, or arbitrariness. 147
Finally, to the extent that courts' reluctance to accord recognition and
remediation to identity-based harms stems from deference to governments
because of concerns about the costs of redistribution, the solution is a
continued critique of such deference. As the Supreme Court itself recently
stated in the labour rights context, "If the touchstone of Charter compliance
is deference, what is the point of judicial scrutiny? 1 4
146. See, e.g., Miron v Trudel, supra note 118 (recognizing marital status so as to extend benefits).
147. See Watson Hamilton & Koshan, "Adverse Impact," supra note 43.
148. Saskatchewan Federation ofLabour, supra note gat para 76, Abella J, for the majority (critiquing
the dissenting justices' refusal to include the right to strike within the scope of s 2(d)).

